"[Reading Ebersole] requires and often succeeds in producing a radical reorientation of one´s thinking . . . " from a book review Things We Know is a collection of fifteen essays that focus on perennial philosophical problems about knowledge. The essays let you participate in Frank Ebersole´s unique struggles to come to terms with such questions as: Can we know the world? . . . the past? . . . the future? . . . of God´s existence? . (...) . . whether our actions are free? . . . the foundations of logic and language? This is not just another philosophy book about problems of knowledge. In Things We Know, Ebersole, by carefully using examples, exposes the problems to be the products of philosophical pictures. The examples also make the pictures less compelling. Thus, by reading this philosophy book readers can join the author in working to free themselves from some perplexing philosophical concerns. How the Second Edition differs from the First Edition This edition differs from the First Edition (University of Oregon Books, 1967) in three ways. An essay is added. "Everyman´s Ontological Argument" has been inserted as Essay 14, following two other essays about the ontological argument. "Everyman´s Ontological Argument" was published in the Fall 1978 issue of Philosophical Investigations. (The original Chapter 14, "Where the Action Is," is now Chapter 15.) An essay is replaced. The original Essay 3, "How Philosophers See Stars," has been replaced by a modified version that was printed in Philosophy Today (no. 2, 1969). The replacement includes some further improvements. The text is improved. Throughout the book, the author has made corrections, stylistic improvements, and changed the wording as needed to make clearer his line of thought. Summary Each of the fifteen essays takes up a philosophical problem. In most of the essays, Ebersole first clarifies the problem and reviews common attempts to resolve the problem. Then he focuses on the central ideas and terms used to state the problem and creates examples of people using the terms under consideration. The examples are unique because of their focus on the context and point of what we say. If his investigations fail to find a use of the terms that supports the philosophical problem, he is led to conclude that the problem does not really derive from a philosophical insight but rather arises from a philosophical picture or model. Preface The essays in Things We Know address some of the perennial philosophical problems of knowledge. The essays are unified by being similar in method and philosophic aim. Ebersole exposes a picture behind each problem. In the essays he works through some of the ways that pictures control our thinking and tries to make the pictures less compelling. Chapters 1 6: Perception and Language Chapter 1: "Seeing Red in Red Things" Philosophical problem: Must words for simple visual properties (e.g., "red") refer to things because the things share some property (e.g., redness)? Can we see this property? Topics investigated: Family resemblances, properties of colors, when we regard things as the same, when we regard colors as the same, when we regard things as having common properties, language-world philosophical pictures. Philosophers discussed: A. J. Ayer, J. Herder, J. S. Mill. Chapter 2: "Seeing Things" Philosophical problem: Do hallucinations and afterimage. (shrink)

Takes up Kripke's theory of reference for proper names and natural kind words. Advocates investigation by means of ordinary language examples. Finds the problem for which Kripke's theory is offered as an answer seems to rest on an implausible picture of language.

[Frank Ebersole is a philosopher] "whose contribution to philosophy... is the greatest of anyone this [the 20th] century, especially in the areas of philosophy of language, theory of knowledge, and perception." from Wittgenstein, Empiricism, and Language by John W. Cook (Oxford University Press, 1999). Language and Perception has nine chapters: seven that address philosophical problems about language and two (chapters 2 and 9) that are more metaphilosophical The metaphilosophical chapters discuss philosophical pictures and some of Frank Ebersole's basic (...) ideas about philosophy. The other seven essays let you participate in his unique struggles to come to terms with such questions as: What is the meaning of a word? Isn't Wittgenstein's idea that things called by the same name have family resemblances significantly flawed? Does language determine what we perceive? Does a thing's being red cause it to look red (the causal theory of perception)? Must the action of speaking be analyzed into simpler actions such as making sounds? Can a bodily movement be part of an action? Is fatalism implied by "what one might say" about the future? Are "natural-kind" words like proper names? are they rigid designators? This and its companion volume, Meaning and Saying, are not just other philosophy books about the philosophy of language. In both books Ebersole, by carefully using examples, convincingly shows that the problems are the products of philosophical pictures. The examples also make the pictures less compelling. How the Second Edition Differs from the First Edition This edition differs from the first edition (University Press of America, 1979) in several ways. Pictures: Material that was formerly part of a postscript to chapter 1 has been revised and is now its own chapter, chapter 2, "Pictures and Wittgenstein on Pictures." As a result the following chapters were renumbered. Essay removed: Chapter 7 in the first edition, "Truth and Fate: Future Actions," has been removed. Essay added: A new essay, entitled "Proper Names and Other Names," has been added to the volume. It's a revised version of an essay originally published in Philosophical Investigations, Oct., 1982, with the title "Stalking the Rigid Designator." Postscript: Material that was formerly part of the preface is now revised and placed as chapter 9 at the end, entitled "Postscript." Improved text: Throughout the book, Ebersole has made corrections, stylistic improvements, and changed the wording to remove ambiguities. Preface The book is concerned with questions about the "relations of language to reality": Does physical reality predetermine the form of our language? Does it determine the kinds of words in our simple, basic vocabulary? Does our language in basic ways determine the way we perceive reality? Does our language embody the outlines of a certain theory of perception? And does it incorporate a certain view of human actions and of the future? These questions are expressions of the problems in the philosophy of language that people inevitably get themselves into while dealing with other philosophical problems. And these are problems in the philosophy of language that have direct consequences for the way one deals with problems in other branches of philosophy. At. (shrink)

Interessanter Artikel. Ebersole fordert ein extensionales Kriterium für die Unterscheidung, erklärt die Suche aber für aussichtslos. Er betont, dass nur Aussagen analytisch sind, nicht Sätze. Er betont, dass empirische Allsätze weder prinzipiell analytisch noch synthetisch sind, ihr Wahrheitswert ist unbestimmt. Erst, wenn wir alle Gegenstände kennen, die unter den allquantifizierten Begriff fallen, können wir dies sagen. (Hier habe ich Probleme, da ich Allquantifikation über undefinierten Begriffen unzulässig finde.).

I want to consider some difficulties which I have on rereading the passages on “common properties” or “common features” and “family resemblances” in The Blue Book and in Philosophical Investigations. These passages are not as easy to read as they once were. Wittgenstein tells us that we think, or have a tendency to think, that all the things to which we apply a general word have some property or feature in common, and he tells us that we believe it is (...) because of this common property or feature that we apply the same word to them. In The Blue Book the phrase is “common property”; in Philosophical Investigations it is “common feature.” Wittgenstein may have changed from the word “property” to the word “feature” because the word “property” is obviously too limited in its application. We speak of the properties of mercury or neoprene but not of the properties of barnowls or slatterns. The word “feature” also seems too limited in a way, but he may have chosen this word mainly because it fits his metaphor of family resemblances. I do not think that Wittgenstein wants to impose any special restriction at this point, so I shall use the word “feature” only where it is appropriate, and I shall use the less limiting word “characteristic” where it seems more appropriate than the word “feature.” Thus I assume that Wittgenstein means to examine our tendency to think that a general word is applied to things because those things have some features or features, characteristic or characteristics in common. (shrink)

Retrato de uma jovem em chamas, filme de Céline Sciamma, propõe a discussão sobre o “olhar feminino”, tanto na pintura quanto no cinema. O artigo parte da perspectiva dos Estudos Feministas e busca correlações entre o filme e o cânone da literatura, da pintura e do cinema e o sistema patriarcal que lhes dá suporte. Observa como esse cânone instrumentaliza um culto à passividade feminina e sua inscrição enquanto objeto na História, estetizando “a mulher morta” como índice dessa representação. Parte (...) da hipótese de que a imagem da mulher pode ser aprofundada pela narrativa de autoria feminina enquanto lugar de resistência política. Busca posicionar-se contra o apagamento das experiências lésbicas, ao torná-las visíveis e construir sentido sobre elas.Palavras-chave: Olhar Feminino. Cinema. Pintura. Cânone. Experiência Lésbica. AbstractPortrait of a lady on fire, film by Céline Sciamma, proposes a discussion on the “female gaze”, both in painting and in cinema. The article is based on the Feminist Studies perspective and seeks correlations between film and the canon of literature, painting, and cinema, and the patriarchal system that supports them. It observes how this canon instrumentalizes a cult of female passivity and its inscription as an object in history, aestheticizing “the dead woman” as an index of this representation. It is based on the hypothesis that the image of women can be deepened by the female authorship narrative as a site of political resistance. It seeks to position itself against the erasure of lesbian experiences, by making them visible and building meaning upon them.Keywords: Female Gaze. Cinema. Painting. Canon. Lesbian Experience. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:kamikaze, Cherry Blossoms, and Nationalisms: The Militarization of Aesthetics in Japanese HistoryGary L. Ebersolekamikaze, Cherry Blossoms, and Nationalisms: The Militarization of Aesthetics in Japanese History. By Emiko Ohnuki-Tierney. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002. Pp. xvii + 411.In the 2004 American presidential campaign, a film clip of a young John Kerry testifying against the Vietnam War before a congressional committee hearing received significant television air time. In the (...) clip, Kerry poignantly asks: "How do you ask a young man in his twenties to be the last to die in the Vietnam War?" In kamikaze, Cherry Blossoms, and Nationalisms: The Militarization of Aesthetics in Japanese History, anthropologist Emiko Ohnuki-Tierney attempts to answer a similar set of questions regarding the best and the brightest young Japanese men sent to their deaths as kamikaze pilots in the closing days of the Pacific War. "How and why," she asks, "do individuals sacrifice themselves for the[ir] country?" "When a soldier 'volunteers' to die for his country, does he do so both in thought and in action? Or does he sacrifice himself only in action without espousing the ideology of state nationalism in toto?" (p. 1).Ohnuki-Tierney suggests that in recent years, as a reaction against structuralism, many anthropologists have shifted their attention to issues of praxis (what social actors and agents do). This shift is certainly evident, but I wonder if her next characterization is accurate: "Thus we now seldom differentiate between reproduction of behavior and that of an ideology or thought structure" (p. 186). She is certainly correct [End Page 607] to answer two of her own additional questions in the negative: "Is identifying reproduction in behavior enough for us to understand historical continuity and discontinuity? Is our quest satisfied if we find that a perfect reproduction takes place in action, even in the absence of reproduction in the thoughts and feelings of social agents?" (ibid.). She is wrong, though, to suggest that few other scholars have recognized and addressed this issue. If anything, the issues surrounding structure and change or cultural reproduction and change have been at the center of the work of Marshall Sahlins, James Fernandez, and Talal Asad, to name only three such scholars of note in anthropology. Moreover, generations of sociologists and historians of religion have also grappled with the issues of continuity and change.In this study, Ohnuki-Tierney has made an important contribution to our understanding of the kamikaze pilots by focusing on the lives and writings of a handful of university conscripts. Specifically, she has culled the limited number of published writings in Japanese by these former students, as well as more numerous unpublished diaries, letters, and other documents. Additionally, in an appendix (pp. 307-340) she has compiled a startling list of the works read by four of the kamikaze pilots that can help us to understand their interests and the possible influences on their thoughts. They were extremely well read in theology, philosophy, literature, and political thought—and they read widely in European languages, as well as Japanese. Through these sources, Ohnuki-Tierney attempts to understand why these young men went off to certain death, even when they did not ascribe to the emperor-centered ideology of the Japanese militarist state. In part, she seeks to counter the prevalent image that these patriotic young men worshipped the emperor and died for him. In doing so, she argues for the necessity to distinguish between patriotism and state nationalism, or, to put it another way, between dying for one's country and dying for the emperor.Much of Ohnuki-Tierney's earlier work has dealt with the roles of specific symbols in Japanese society. The Monkey as Mirror: Symbolic Transformations in Japanese History and Ritual (Princeton University Press, 1987) traced the changing uses of the monkey as a symbol of identity and otherness throughout Japanese history, while Rice as Self: Japanese Identities through Time (Princeton University Press, 1993) focused on rice as an important multivalent symbol of Japanese identity. The present study apparently began innocently enough as a study of the symbolic complex surrounding cherry blossoms in Japanese cultural history. Only in the course of her research did Ohnuki... (shrink)

Three principles must be taken into account in assessing the social responsibilities of international business firms in developing areas. The first is an awareness of the historical and institutional dynamics of local communities. This influences the type and range of responsibilities the firm can be expected to assume; it also reveals the limitations of any universal codes of conduct. The second is the necessity of non-intimidating communication with local constituencies. This requires the firm to temper its power and influence by (...) recognizing and responding to local concerns in the pursuit of its own objectives. The third is the degree to which the firm's operations safeguard and indeed improve the social and economic assets of local communities. At issue is the question of adequate compensation for the inevitable disruptions that an international business brings to a local community. Beneficial returns must be shared and sustained over the long term in an equitable manner. The nine studies in this special edition illustrate in different ways the importance of these three principles. (shrink)

In 1978, 16 months after Mao Zedong’s death, China’s new leader, Deng Xiaoping, introduced market reforms and an “opening” to the West that allowed the US company Hewlett-Packard to enter China in 1981. Shortly thereafter, HP began a partnership with the Chinese company Legend Computer, through which HP transferred its technology in four main areas: product technology, business model, management practices, and strategic planning processes. This technology transfer seems to be a “just exchange” in that HP received access to China’s (...) market while China received key managerial, marketing, and product technologies. Although multinationals are often criticized for their dealings with developing nations, the HP–Legend case provides an illustration of how a company from an industrialized nation can deal justly with a developing nation and assist in advancing its development. The transfer of technology from HP to Legend was facilitated by several factors, including HP’s historical willingness to help startups, its strategic posture, a favorable local environment, Legend’s recognition of its own needs, its willingness to learn from a foreign company, and the incentives to share technology that the Chinese government provided. (shrink)

In _Beyond Animal Rights_, Josephine Donovan and Carol J. Adams introduced feminist "ethic of care" theory into philosophical discussions of the treatment of animals. In this new volume, seven essays from _Beyond Animal Rights_ are joined by nine new articles-most of which were written in response to that book-and a new introduction that situates feminist animal care theory within feminist theory and the larger debate over animal rights. Contributors critique theorists' reliance on natural rights doctrine and utilitarianism, which, they (...) suggest, have a masculine bias. They argue for ethical attentiveness and sympathy in our relationships with animals and propose a link between the continuing subjugation of women and the human domination of nature. Beginning with the earliest articulation of the idea in the mid-1980s and continuing to the theory's most recent revisions, this volume presents the most complete portrait of the evolution of the feminist-care tradition. (shrink)

In this revision of a seminal work, O'Donovan describes the shape of a Christian moral theology which has wide implications for creation, history, knowledge, freedom, and authority--his purpose being to outline a system of theological ethics and to describe the nature of the moral response within redeemed creation: acts of surrender, obedience, and love.

This article examines the means by which Malaysian governments have been relatively successful in pursuing both economic development and social equity. These advances have been remarkable, given Malaysia's history of colonial servitude and racial and ethnic tensions. The authors' examination of government economic and social policies notes the importance of strong political leadership that is committed to creating a national identity through consensus building. In pursuing these social objectives, successive governments have also played an active and transparent role in fostering (...) economic growth and development. However, a number of problems remain as Malaysia continues to follow these social and economic policies. (shrink)

Contains eight contributions which extend feminist ethic-of-care theory to the issue of animal well-being. As a group, the essays aim to suggest ways that theorists can move beyond the notion of animal rights to establish care as a basis for the ethical treatment of animals. Annotation c. by Book.

Leading political theologian Oliver O'Donovan here takes a fresh look at some traditional moral arguments about war. Modern Christians differ widely on this issue. A few hold that absolute pacifism is the only viable Christian position, others subscribe in various ways to concepts of 'just war' developed out of a Western tradition that arose from the legacies of Augustine and Aquinas, while others still adopt more pragmatically realist postures. Professor O'Donovan re-examines questions of contemporary urgency including the use (...) of biological and nuclear weapons, military intervention, economic sanctions, war crimes trials and the roles of the Geneva Convention, international conventions and the UN. His enquiry opens with a challenging dedication to the new Archbishop of Canterbury and proceeds to shed new light on vital topics with which the Archbishop and others will be very directly engaged. It should be read by anyone concerned with the ethics of warfare. (shrink)

In recent decades, Russell’s “Neutral Monism” has reemerged as a topic of great scholarly interest among philosophers of mind, philosophers of science, and historians of early analytic philosophy. One of the most controversial points of scholarly dispute regarding Russell’s theory concerns how it best fits into standard classificatory schemes for understanding the relationship between mental phenomena and physical reality. The task of classifying Russell’s Neutral Monism is made all the more difficult by the fact that his conception of it evolves (...) in significant ways over the roughly four decades that he advocates it. In this paper, I contend that during this period, Russell holds (at least) three different, but related, ontological views, all of which he labels as “neutral monism”. This paper begins by considering key aspects of Russell’s early dualism which continue to play important roles in his Neutral Monism, especially his views about acquaintance, knowledge by description, structuralism about physics, and the construction of our physical knowledge. I argue that Russell revises, rather than abandons, his notion of knowledge by acquaintance in 1918 (when he gives up the act-object distinction) and contend that his resulting “neutral monism” remains a partial dualism until his 1921 The Analysis of Mind (hereafter AMi). Next, I explain how changes in physics leads Russell to re-conceptualize his Neutral Monism in The Analysis of Matter and An Outline of Philosophy, while challenging the relatively widespread view that his new position is a nonstandard version of physicalism. Finally, I argue that after 1940, Russell’s mature Neutral Monism—as presented in Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits, My Philosophical Development, and elsewhere—is very plausibly interpreted as a version of “Russellian Physicalism”. (shrink)

Neutral monism is the view that both ‘mind’ and ‘matter’ are grounded in a more fundamental form of reality that is intrinsically neither mental nor material. It has often been treated as an odd fringe theory deserving of at most a footnote in the broader philosophical debates. Yet such attitudes do a grave disservice to its sophistications and significance for late nineteenth and early twentieth-century philosophy of mind and psychology. This paper sheds light on this neglected view by situating it (...) within broader historical monist debates about the mind and bringing attention to one of its central internal disputes regarding ‘mental chemistry’. By taking a closer look at how Ernst Mach, William James, and Bertrand Russell address the question of whether and how our mental episodes are composed of more basic elements, it highlights deep differences among their conceptions of the fundamental ‘neutral stuff’ and its relations to ‘mind’ and ‘matter’. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that a number of recent Russell interpreters, including Evans, Davidson, Campbell, and Proops, mistakenly attribute to Russell what I call ‘the received view of acquaintance’: the view that acquaintance safeguards us from misidentifying the objects of our acquaintance. I contend that Russell’s discussions of phenomenal continua cases show that he does not accept the received view of acquaintance. I also show that the possibility of misidentifying the objects of acquaintance should be unsurprising given underappreciated aspects (...) of Russell’s overall theory of knowledge and acquaintance. Finally, I consider the radical impact that Russell’s actual views on acquaintance have for our understanding of his well-known George IV case in ‘On Denoting’. In particular, I argue that Russell’s treatment of the George IV case is not a one-size-fits-all solution to Frege’s Puzzle and provides no support for the received view of acquaintance. (shrink)

Beauvoir’s Ethics of Ambiguity appears to defend a distinctly existentialist, deontologically-constrained version of consequentialism. On that interpretation, her belief that freedom consists in the real possibilities provided by our concrete situation leads her to reject Kantian autonomy to allow for some consequentialist decisions, while her belief that our situation derives its meaning from freely-chosen projects leads her to limit such choices to their consequences for situated freedom rather than general happiness. However, I will argue that Beauvoir’s view is better understood (...) as a non-deontological, internal critique of consequentialism, rooted in Marx’s historical materialism rather than her existentialist commitments. Beauvoir challenges consequentialism’s tendency to evaluate decision-making over actions, and intended or predicted consequences over actual ones, considering consequences during a limited time-frame despite their variable, contingent future value. In other words, consequentialism is insufficiently consequentialist, a view rooted in historical materialism in two ways. First, her materialist understanding of freedom as situated possibility requires an ethics that prioritizes real rather than projected consequences. Materialist consequentialism acknowledges outcomes are never final and so refuses to assign unambiguous moral value. A decision’s ethical value is preserved only to the degree that the value of its real consequences for existing individuals’ projects is maintained into the indefinite future. Second, her view that value is historical, a human creation based in our actual situation’s contingent utility to our individually chosen projects, denies that any consequence has a fixed value independent of the historical development of humanity as realized through individual choices. Historical-materialist consequentialism demands moral agents retroactively reassess the moral status of every action in order to repair consequences that have, because of changing human purposes, become obstacles to freedom. Together, these historical materialist constraints ground Beauvoir’s demand for an ethics that is ambiguous in principle as well as practice: no decision, action, or consequence has a fixed moral value because consequences are always incomplete and, even when they do not change, the projects that give them value change. While compatible with existentialist conceptions of freedom, responsibility, and authenticity, her ethics does not require such commitments, making it more Marxist than existentialist in character. (shrink)

This chapter provides an introduction to panpsychism, panprotopsychism, and neutral monism to an interdisciplinary audience.

Over the course of recent years, various scientific advances in the realm of reproduction have changed the reproductive landscape, enhancing women’s procreative rights and the choices available to them. Uterus transplants (UTx) are the latest of such medical innovations aimed at restoring fertility in women suffering from absolute uterine factor infertility, providing them with the possibility not only of conceiving a genetically related child but also of gestating their own pregnancies. This paper critically examines the primacy of reproductive liberty in (...) the context of uterus transplantation. It questions whether and to what extent we should respect the reproductive autonomy of a woman who chooses UTx, given the significant risks that attach to the procedure and existing concerns that UTx may perpetuate potentially troubling gendered norms surrounding pregnancy and the role of women’s bodies in reproduction, which may place undue reproductive pressures on women. (shrink)

In this essay I suggest that Heidegger’s Being and Time provides a ground for ethics in the notion of Dasein’s ‘Being-guilty.’ Being-guilty is not a ground for ethics in the sense of a demonstration of the moral ‘ought’ or a refutation of moral skepticism. Rather, Being-guilty serves as a foundation for ethical life in a way uniquely suited to a phenomenological form of ethics, a way that clarifies, from a phenomenological point of view, why the traditional approach to ethics is (...) misguided. The traditional attempt to ground ethics through demonstration or refutation depends upon a misunderstanding of obligation as an imposition that is distinct from, and inflicted upon, the subject in a way that is in need of justification. Heidegger’s conception of Being-guilty, on the contrary, identifies the basis of moral obligation in a form of primary selfobligation that is constitutive of human nature, rather than an imposition upon it. Although primordial guilt or self-obligation does not justify ethical obligation, it does ‘ground’ ethics. For it is the primary source and support of our ethical activity in two distinct senses. First, it serves as the condition for the possibility of our indebtedness to others—it enables us to be morally obligated. It enables moral obligation towards others by determining Dasein as ontologically indebted to care for its own being—a being which is, in turn, ontologically determined as care for others. Second, Being-guilty provides a criterion for distinguishing what we call ethical and unethical behavior. Ethical behavior is distinguished according to the appropriateness of one’s care for the other according to proper recognition of the nature of the Other’s Being as Dasein. (shrink)

In his article, a unified brain-based determination of death is described by James Bernat (2024) as a permanent cessation of systemic circulation causing a permanent cessation of brain circulation...